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Abstract: This paper reports on personal experience writing and teaching a 2nd Year Subject 
in Globalisation and the World Economy in Semester 2, 2014, before the full ending of 
Quantitative Easing and 7 years after the closure of Lehman Brothers.  Given the evident 
failure of mainstream economists to predict the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) or on the whole 
to revise their teaching subsequently, this situation poses fine problems for a lecturer and 
class leader, in that it is not at once obvious how in teaching terms the evident failure to 
predict the GFC can be fairly and adequately managed. The point here is that whilst almost 
all economists failed to do so, the analysis in Lindauer and Pritchett 2002 suggests that 
economists’ confidence in economics as a science and their belief that market failure is 
relatively insignificant has continued. The point of this paper is to explain how this (only in 
part) pedagogical problem was solved through a particular teaching encounter. The focus is 
upon the management of epistemological issues: for example, how to engage students in a 
broad discussion of possible implications of the failure of mainstream economic analysis in 
general to predict the GFC and how to avoid various well-known pitfalls (such as pretending 
that it was simply a mistake, by contrast with what the lecturer now says in hindsight), 
whilst retaining student interest. The course was a success, so far as evident from student 
remarks and participation, and the usual formal ex post evaluation.  
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Goals of the paper  
The goals of this paper are to share with colleagues my experience teaching a 2nd/3rd Year 
semester subject1 called ‘Globalisation and the World Economy’. I taught this as a sessional 
lecturer – that is, as a ‘one-off’ – taught once - and was free to teach what I liked, though 
the outline was approved beforehand by the Economics Faculty. As a scholar, I am mainly an 
applied researcher, with most of my publications on Vietnam, where I am perhaps the most 
widely-cited author, but I have a second publishing stream on matters of method [Fforde 
2005, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017]; even more heterodox is that I have made most of my living 
since my post-doc as a development consultant, mainly in Vietnam, where I have had much 
opportunity to observe the certainties of many advice-givers. A maxim in contemporary aid 
practice (as elsewhere) is the value of reflective practice, and this paper attempts to share 
with colleagues how I set about putting together, and then teaching (lectures and classes) 
the semester subject. It will become clear that I treat economics as a non-predictive science 
(Fforde 2016, 2017). For me it follows that it is vital to secure good management and 
support of judgements as to the value of economists’ accounts, so as to engage better with 
possible capture and validation by forces outside of economic science. The issue is how to 
do this without using one’s position as a teacher to assert the validity of this or that 
particular account of globalisation and the world economy; interestingly, this led me to 
place perhaps more rather than less emphasis upon introducing students to the relevant 
facts and review of just what National Income Accounts say they do—what, actually, is GDP?  
Goals of the subject2 
The goals of the teaching exercise were not, ex ante, very clear. This was quite deliberate: I 
was not teaching Engineering or Differential Calculus. I wanted students to be exposed to 
data and theories in ways that allowed and supported the exercise of their own informed 
judgement; and developed a supportive subject outline (see Appendix; full teaching 
materials are available from the author on request). I do not view teaching and learning, 
especially when students will enhance their capacity to make informed judgements, as 
wisely framed in terms of metaphors of delivery and learning outcomes. With this stance, 
                                                     
1 In the local terminology, subject means an elective one semester course, here ‘Globalisation and the World 
Economy’. There was no strict sequentiality, meaning that students had to have done other subjects 
beforehand. The form taken was two lectures a week and a single ‘class’ (that is, in the local terminology, a 
weekly 1 hour session with about two dozen students led by either a lecturer or a PhD student, with topics 
given out in advance for discussion, opportunity to discuss the content of the lectures and readings, and 
presentations). Student numbers were such that there were 5 classes of which I took 3 and a PhD student took  
2. I made the point during the first lecture that I would use no mathematics with the expected outcome that 
some students did not come to subsequent lectures.  
2 At the University where this was taught, a semester ‘subject’ is taught by a lecturer in a semester and marked 
as such. Typically there are 4 such subjects per semester.  This is potentially confusing (I found it so when I first 
started teaching) as many other universities would call this a course, but the University is sufficiently sovereign 
to continue this practice.  
students as they explore how they may get good marks quickly ask the key question – ‘what 
if you disagree with our answers?’ To which I reply: ‘if I like and respect how you get there 
you will get good marks’. Ex post, the goals I think, had I asked students, would have 
produced a range of answers. As is well known from development (aid) work, repeated 
evaluations of the same activity tend to produce a range of accounts.3 And all economists 
know from Welfare Economics 101 that interpersonal and intertemporal comparisons of 
welfare cannot be made other than subjectively.4 So far as I can judge, the students in their 
different ways valued the experience rather highly.  
I start by considering an aspect of the context: the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)—known in 
some places by different phrases, but referring to the economic difficulties marked by the 
collapse of Lehman brothers—and some broad arguments about economists’ beliefs. This 
explains my starting-off point and should help to explain how I framed the teaching 
experience. I then return to the more technical issues of how the subject was taught.  
The GFC and trends in economists’ beliefs 
Because the Global Financial Crisis was both extremely damaging and generally unforeseen,5 
and also an economic topic, it would be expected to have generated increased student 
interest in economics and some degree of revision amongst economics lecturers.  A recent 
study of research on teaching undergraduate economics (Allgood et al. , 2015) reports that 
in the USA whilst over one million undergraduates take introductory economics, only about 
30,000 graduate yearly as economics majors [ibid., p.294]. This is less than in political 
science, history and sociology [ibid., p.287]; further, the “coursework for the economics 
major has not changed substantially since 1980” [ibid., p.317]. In other words, two aspects 
of the GFC – the widespread failure of economists to predict it, and the associated pressure 
for some fundamental change in the content of economics as a taught discipline – seem to 
have had little effect. Comparison can be made with the Keynesian revolution after WWII, 
which supported large-scale state intervention, and the change, in a very different direction, 
of the late 1970s and 1980s toward the far more-market friendly stance reported by Allgood 
et al., 2015. Interestingly, they strikingly, do not make this comparison, which comes down 
to situating the content of economics as taught in its changing historical context.  
This view contrasts with, for example, Lindauer and Pritchett (2002) which offers a clear and 
powerful explanation of factors influencing economists’ beliefs in the early 1980s. They 
contrast these with beliefs two decades earlier, influenced by experiences of the Great 
Depression and WWII, and in so doing imply, by contrast with Allgood et al., that 
economists’ views are not defined by their understanding of unchanging economic laws: 
                                                     
3“The mixed findings from … evaluation studies are typical. Where several evaluation studies are found the 
most usual finding is that results vary.” [Tilley, (2000), p.4]  
4 Readers may conclude that I reject the idea that teaching can and should be understood as necessarily and 
always a delivery of definable knowledge leading to certain learning outcomes.  
5 Underlying this statement, of course untrue for heterodox approaches such as Marxism,  for whom crisis is an 
essential part of their framing of capitalist dynamics (Fforde, 2010; 2011), is evidence that the great mass of 
economics teaching is limited to what I would call the neoclassical orthodoxy, which, in a nutshell, asserts a 
realist position, specifically that the standard models (especially of microeconomics) map closely enough to 
observable reality to be taken by students as good (predictive) guides to action. 
“When you were in your thirties, you would have experienced the Great Depression. You 
would therefore know for a fact that a capitalist economy is unstable: stock markets can 
and do crash, unregulated banks fail, and unemployment can soar to very high levels and 
stay there. Whether or not you believe activist government responses are effective, you 
know they are popular—the architect of those policies won four of the first six 
presidential elections of your life. … You would also have witnessed the amazing ability of 
a war economy to mobilize production.  … the big facts of your (hypothetical) life in 1962 
practically compel three big ideas: government can be the driving force behind rapid 
industrialization; accumulation is the key to rapid economic growth; and integration into 
the world is necessary for certain key products, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for rapid growth” [Lindauer and Pritchett (2002), p.2-3, 4]. 
For the later generation:  
“The events of 1962 to 1982 suggested that the previous consensus had it exactly 
backward on almost every dimension of the development strategy. The new 
conventional wisdom reversed policy recommendations and called for a new role for 
multilaterals” [ibid. p.8] 
This can be encapsulated in the new belief that market failure, previously believed to be 
large, justifying extensive state intervention, in fact was not. The extent of market failure 
was, as an empirical issue, now believed to be far less than in the past. Left to their own 
devices, markets were now believed, more often than earlier, to work. Clearly, the GFC 
offers prima facie a considerable challenge to such beliefs, comparable to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. One would thus have expected some major changes afterwards, 
contrary to what was reported by Allgood et al. (2015).  
But then, Lindauer and Pritchett also argue that two decades after 1982, much had again 
changed: “Fast forward again, to 2002. What are the big facts of our lives?” [ibid., p.9] 
Generally these “big facts” are a combination of evidence (such as Easterly’s ‘Lost decades’ 
Easterly, 2001) that,   
"if adjustment and the Washington Consensus are finished, what are the obvious, 
commonsense, big ideas dictated by today’s big facts …? Are there no lessons to be 
extracted from the failures and successes of the last forty years? Perhaps this is just a 
false nostalgia for simpler times, but it seems harder than ever to identify the keys to 
growth. For every example, there is a counter-example. The current nostrum of one size 
doesn’t fit all is not itself a big idea, but a way of expressing the absence of any big ideas” 
[ibid., p.13] 
Lindauer and Pritchett (2002, p. 26) concluded that more and more effective analyses of 
particular situations was needed [ibid., p.26]. Had this happened in persuasive ways, given 
the stakes implied by the GFC and economists’ general failure to predict it, then one would 
expect Allgood et al. to have reported on radical changes, similar to those between the early 
1960s and the early 1980s, to what was taught and avidly consumed by students. But this, it 
appears, has not happened. If we believe what they have to say, the course context has not 
changed from 1980, and such a powerful conservatism is supported by their remark that 
there is very little variation in content between textbooks [Allgood et al., p. 304]. Students 
will then, perhaps, ask what the empirical basis for economic science is, given recent 
history.  
The teaching problem/opportunity 
This situation poses problems for teaching, in that it is not obvious how the evident failure 
to predict the GFC can be fairly and adequately managed in the classroom–that is, how 
should it be taught?. The point here is that almost all mainstream economists failed to do 
so, but that by contrast Lindauer & Pritchett’s analysis suggests that economists’ confidence 
in economics as a science and their belief that market failure is relatively insignificant has 
continued. My paper explains how this problem was solved through a particular teaching 
encounter. A central point is that students are best treated as adults rather than children, 
or, in other words, that issues that in scholarly terms exist at high levels (e.g.,  confirmation 
bias – Fforde, 2016) are best presented to students ‘experientially;’ in other words  to so 
present lectures so students  can work things out, based upon readings and their own 
reflections. It is my experience in Australia and Singapore that this teaching stance is 
experienced by students as liberating, hard work and efficient in terms of the perceived 
costs of progress.   
A few weeks before the second semester of 2014 I was asked to teach a 2nd year course at 
Melbourne University, specifically: Globalisation and the World Economy. This paper shares 
with colleagues how I went about this, and especially how I managed the tensions created 
by the Global Financial Crisis, which were mainly manifest in how to organise the treatment 
and presentation of economic ideas without falling into the traps of either drowning 
students in arguments for and against what different people said had happened, or getting 
wrong the balance between presenting empirically interesting accounts of relevant topics 
and helping students to understand the underlying theories. This could be phrased as the 
attempt to balance ‘constructivist’ and ‘realist’ perspectives. It explicitly or implicitly 
(depending on what students are told) requires that students deal with epistemological 
issues. I had a number of unsolicited emails from students saying that they found the course 
refreshing, eye-opening and unexpected; and students’ formal evaluations that were carried 
out as part of the usual administrative procedures were very positive.  
Teaching strategy 
 
This section presents the course outline and lecture structure. Here I want to discuss the 
teaching strategy.  
If students are to feel confident in managing arguments about evident serious mistakes in 
policy advice and economic analysis, then it is not sufficient to offer an explanation as to 
why a particular economic analysis was wrong, and another right. This is partly because of 
the issue of ‘confirmation bias’, in that the student is encouraged to accept a lecturer’s 
explanation by the simple fact that the lecturer will mark the exam. In a contentious area, 
why should the teacher’s explanation be treated as correct? To get around this, something 
extra is needed. Students need to be given a sense that there are ways to approach, or in 
other words that epistemology is useful and nothing to be intimidated by. This in turn 
requires a suitable strategy to empower and guide students in how they assess different 
accounts, which is more than providing an explanation of how certain accounts are wrong. 
The basic point is that students should experience ‘stuff’ (their usual word) that offers 
explanations for the nature of the accounts they are given to read, or have explained in 
lectures, that are epistemological. The easiest way is to tell them openly and up-front that 
that is exactly what you are doing, and then lead into some framework that makes sense, 
which treats economic ideas as part of historical reality.  
This can be (and was) put as follows:  
 Globalisation is itself influenced by ideas and beliefs about the world economy,      
including economics; a key issue here is that of policy rationalities (by which I mean 
how policy is thought to work both as a knowledge and as a conceptual organising 
framework for action).6  
 Ideas and beliefs vary globally, and have varied over time, with major 
changes and differences with arguably powerful effects 
 Whilst the topic has very rich empirics (lots of data) this data is itself both 
complicated, and is viewed through particular lenses. The nature of the data 
is itself interesting.  
This means that the lectures and materials were telling students that ideas matter, and so 
they would need to cope with this, and so coping (better or badly) with the problem of how 
to assess different theories and approaches – this is far more than just theory X is wrong. In 
other words, it is about epistemology. The course, they were told, stresses the importance 
of various change processes, including changes in dominant economic ideas, and in the 
recent history of the world economy, helping students to consider where things are heading 
and at what pace. They were also told that this overall approach was reflected in the arc of 
the course, and (importantly) how it would be assessed.  
In the initial lectures, the course took the form of an introduction to ideas about theory, as a 
quick overview, and then looked at issues of theories and empirics with a preliminary look at 
the standard portfolio of economic models students are expected to know, then to the 
question of how to gauge these empirically (Weeks 1 & 2). The course then revised some 
basic empirical tools used by economists (NIA, BoP and Flows of Funds) so as to look more 
clearly at reports of important structural trends in the world economy, including 
interactions between urbanisation and ‘servicisation’, and that some basic demographic 
patterns may have strong effects on savings patterns and global interactions (Weeks 3 & 4). 
Thus by the end of Week 4 the lectures discussed  epistemology, standard but basic 
economic theories, empirical tools and important accounts/narratives of what is happening 
(such as World Bank reports). This operated as a foundation to investigate ideas about the 
                                                     
6 The point I intended to make to students here is to avoid the common assumption that reality is known with 
sufficient clarity and accuracy that cause-effect logics in an account or theory map predictively to observable 
reality. Most social science accounts, including economists’ models, contain cause-effect logic framed as X 
leads to Y.  Assuming that doing X will lead to Y, in reality, is only one particular policy rationality. A large 
literature argues that this does not comport with the evidence, and other policy rationalities exist (Bridgman 
and Davis, 1998; Shore and Wright, 1997; and Fforde 2010). For an early and classic statement from American 
political science see Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). Fforde (2017) argues strongly for a policy rationality that 
assumes predictive ignorance.  
role of policy in causing change, and then competing theories of globalisation (Weeks 5 and 
6). Parts II and III led students through several topics. Students experienced this as 
empowering. The Appendix gives the Subject Outline.  
Some relevant points here. Above all, and first, formal evaluations and class-room feedback 
showed that the students appreciated the approach and valued it highly: it worked for 
them. They felt that they had learnt about the GFC. 
Second, the assessment structure was designed to support the overall approach. I did not 
assume that the only incentive operating was that of the marks. Judging by engagement 
(both in lectures and classes) I feel it safe to argue that students both wanted good marks 
and to learn.  It is easy to spot students who focus more on the one than the other.  
In terms of marks, students had two essays and a take-home exam. This meant that a wide 
range of marks could be awarded for the first essay to drive home what was wanted without 
this having too much of an effect on the final mark: learning to do what was required was 
therefore cheap in terms of marks. Students participated in classes and were told that they 
were expected to use the quality press (such as Australian Financial Review, The Economist, 
The Financial Times, etc.) to investigate issues arising in the lectures, and to use this to 
contribute to the class. This was in part designed so that they could see, in the aftermath of 
the GFC, what views were out there, and also (and this was policed in terms of my own 
behaviour in the classes I taught and in instructions to the person who took the others) 
experience respect for their own arguments if well-presented.  
In general the classes were good at developing peer-support (including support to non-
native English speakers from native speakers) and mutual respect. Students got a small mark 
for attending and participating actively. Also, by arrangement, students had to make a 
personal presentation, bringing a PDF of an article they considered relevant, and to present 
and discuss it, relating it to an issue raised in the lectures. Students often asked about the 
relevance of possible articles, and also how to manage their essays. The rule adopted was 
that such questions were answered publicly, through the on-line teaching system. In my 
view this encouraged a general stance of empowered assisted active learning. It was stated 
a number of times that a good answer that I disagreed with would be given a good mark. My 
teaching experience here is that students are correctly sceptical about such protestations, 
so that the tone of discussions in class, and the attitude I took in lectures to positions I 
clearly did not respect, were important in getting trust. Willingness to police, to enforce 
rules requiring participation and encouraging the less vocal, and how this was done, helped 
signal that I was more rather than less trustworthy.  
In terms of incentives beyond the mark, I think it was clear that many students valued 
positively a range of aspects of the experience, including being treated like an adult, where 
their own judgements were clearly appreciated. This could be and was enhanced both by 
the overall stance of the subject, and its policing, for example in encouraging the less vocal 
to contribute, in treating discussions as real, and in a sense that the lecturer and class-
teachers were themselves learning from the process. As already mentioned, this implies 
that sophisticated philosophy of science and methodological issues were engaged with 
experientially. An aspect of this was the repeated advice to students to back-hoe (i.e., they 
should actively seek out relevant knowledges for themselves, and treat this positively in 
class) into unfamiliar territory, such as statistical method (Fforde, 2005).  
The first ‘content’ lecture started with a discussion of a World Bank report (Global Economic 
Prospects June 2014); which deliberately used a two-step where the data was initially 
approached (quite overtly) naively, and then (again signalled as such) with a sense that data 
is given meaning in some way – in other words that epistemology matters. This allowed 
students to engage actively, and with some sense of the value of acquired techniques for 
doing so, with a very authoritative Report from a powerful institution. I would add that 
there was a palpable sense of lift in the classroom as students engaged with these issues, 
helped by what could be called a shared pedagogy, or perhaps an explicit narrative of the 
value of discussion of scientific methods, called epistemology.  
This lecture pointed to the specific numbers used, and the fact that the Report was strongly 
policy oriented; it argued conventionally that X is needed to cause Y, where X is largely to do 
with policy – macroeconomic, then structural reforms; its basic unit of analysis is the 
country, which has a government that does policy, and data that measures characteristics of 
economic activity in and of that country. I noted that the Report clearly dodged around 
some serious issues, putting them into the body of the text rather than in the up-front 
headline analysis. For example:  
“In the US, there are signs that the recovery in some asset markets is running ahead of 
the economic cycle, driven in part by very low interest rates. If conditions stay very loose 
too long some of the same kind of vulnerabilities that built up prior to the crisis of 2008 
could re-emerge” (World Bank, 2014, p.22). 
This was not done to criticise the Report, but to help students see it from a distance and to 
identify and think about how its argument was constructed. It helped that this was a big 
Rport from a big organisation; and as undergraduates they were reading it and, as citizens, 
thinking about what it meant to them. The lecture then contextualized the Report. A 
number of options existed for how to do this; I adopted two. Here I was very careful to 
avoid simplistic ‘world theory’ (by this I mean the familiar tendency to argue in terms of 
broad aggregates that do not stand up to disaggregation – for example, statements about 
‘Africa economies’ that include South Africa and Zimbabwe in the same ‘big number’, when 
their economies are very different); but as this was to some extent unavoidable I flagged 
that I was doing so. Again, students found this acceptable and some found it intriguing.  
First, I argued that the world could be seen geographically as showing a ‘Christian Crescent’ 
running west from the eastern end of the Eurasian landmass (the east of the Russian 
Republic), through the (internally) contested central European zone of (ex-Communist) 
countries, through the historical heartland of Europe, now the EU, then across the Atlantic 
and then south through north America to Latin America. I argued that the populations in 
this zone share secular and religious preoccupations, but, since the Reformation, and earlier 
with the split into the Western and Eastern Christian churches, a characteristic ‘multiplicity 
of truths’. Religious wars after the Reformation, and before, tend to make these populations 
believe in the value of a secular state.  
Second, I argued for the historical novelty of reports such as that just put to them. Reading 
World Bank 2014 of course appeared quite normal to them – it was their Global Economic 
Prospects. It contains vast amounts of data on GDP, trade, inflation, etc., arranged on a 
country (or regional) basis. This is the standard method to frame analysis and description of 
the world economy. But I pointed out that such reports are very new, and reflect ideas and 
economic approaches rising to prominence after WWII. I argued that as a broad 
generalisation, before WWII state bodies in countries like Australia were not set up to focus 
upon economic management to anything like the extent they became later. Treasuries were 
not focused upon policy, but upon treasury functions.  Central banks were not focused upon 
policy either, but upon things like management of government borrowing. I argued that this 
all changed after the War, and with the change came data – all countries (including poor 
ones) had to have national income accounts, balance of payments data and economic policy 
to go with them— so they needed trained economists and they recruited them.7 They 
brought economic ideas that were then bound up with economic policy rationalities— how 
to do this and that.  
These two simple points gave students space to think about (and in classes to a certain 
extent play with) the value of an epistemological perspective. Again, active policing of 
classes I think drove home various points: that they were doing the playing, not me; that 
there were rules to how this was done, and that these included a sense of the epistemology 
concerned; and, in a very simple sense, that it was feasible – these texts could be discussed, 
in class, by these students, in ways that were meaningful.  
I was able to say, and did, that in publications like that of the World Bank we are seeing a 
reflection of something very much of its time and place: they could then more easily ask, 
what does this framing do? How does it work? And I could sidestep the why questions they 
asked by posing it, but arguing that whilst we can discuss how such reports explain their 
subject, in fact a far more difficult question is why this change happened.  
I could also then encourage them— and did—as they could see in the World Bank Report – 
to see policy conceptually, apparently varying much in terms of both economists’ views and 
in institutional examples such as the World Bank and easily-accessible alternatives. What 
mainstream accounts share, they could easily see, was, first, a belief that actions can 
predictably lead to certain outcomes, and second, something that can do it. The first means 
that this mainstream policy rationality requires predictive theory (that economists’ models 
work in that sense, doing more than just explain); the second usually means, as we read 
references to policy, the state. In this sense, conceptually, there should be no difference 
between economics and engineering. The puzzle is, that economics is evidently not 
predictively successful – it explains, but it does not predict; it is a social not a natural 
science. But this is not what the World Bank reading suggests. Students seemed to like this 
idea.  
An easy alternative policy rationality to offer them was referring to Deng Xiaoping’s 
statement about China’s step-by-step, rather than blueprint-based, transition from plan to 
market [Naughton 1994].  Here policy rationality, just how government conceived of its role, 
is quite different. 
In this paper I cannot go into detail as to what followed, but this introduction to the subject 
had struck a balance within which students were now expected to exploit ideas and 
arguments I would teach, or that they found in readings given them, or that they found for 
                                                     
7 This point was made more real by reporting that my father was recruited as one of the first economists  
employed by the Bank of England, just after WWII. That this was so recent – but three generations earlier – 
some found very striking.  
themselves, to think about globalisation and the world economy, and what was said about 
it. It is my strong impression, not least as the subject was not taught as part of any 
sequentiality, in the modern modular manner (what one student called the ‘bite size meaty 
chunks’ format), that this is something contemporary students, in part due to their high 
school (and earlier) experiences, find rather easy.8   
The somewhat bald statement that economics was and is not a natural science, in that it is 
not predictive, was rhetorically valuable, supported by the idea put to them that the core 
and most interesting thing about prediction was that it gives, in terms of procedure, a 
requirement that accounts or theories be compared, which forces convergence, arguably 
lacking in the epistemological criteria applied by economists. They did not find this idea 
challenging or novel, but I think it is actually both.9  
I argued that once we admit that economic theory is not predictive, we are in a world (of 
analysis and thought) where criteria applied to decide what we think of a model or account 
gets complicated. We can manage this in different ways. One is to think how beliefs, about 
economic matters, are important not so much because they are right or wrong, but because 
they influence behaviour. Another is to be aware of ideas about how beliefs form and how 
they work in their own terms. This foundation was then used to engage students with some 
relevant economists’ models, relevant, approached from four angles: 
 The nature of these models, as models 
 Some evidence for how economists’ beliefs have varied over time, so that 
belief in some models has been replaced by belief in others 
                                                     
8 I would think that for colleagues teaching subjects with sequentiality, who can assume a certain shared 
knowledge of subjects such as economics principles, or basic quantitative methods, would permit a review of 
those subjects framed epistemologically. A very valuable area for students is to review National Income 
Accounting, for few have been able to think through implications of its basis in factor income generation, so 
that an implicit production function choice underlies, inter alia, any subsequent discussion in terms of real 
factor inputs (with implied distributional assumptions), and so sectoral GDP data. Another, related 
confirmation bias and statistical method, is put well in a quote from Cohen (1994): “What is wrong with NHST 
[Null Hypothesis Significance Testing]? Well, among other things, it does not tell us what we want to know, 
and we so much want to know what we want to know that, out of desperation, we nevertheless believe that it 
does! What we want to know is, “Given these data, what is the probability that H0 [the Null Hypothesis] is 
true?” But as most of us know, what it tells us is “Given H0 is true, what is the probability of these (or more 
extreme) data?” These are not the same, as has been pointed out many times over the years.”  [p.997] Review 
of these basis issues through an epistemological framing may add value to the original courses, often taught to 
first year students, when they are older.  
9 Fforde (2017) and Fforde (2016) both drew upon this particular teaching experience. The point I put to the 
students, which I think they found both unexceptional and not novel, though it is actually in scholarly terms 
very novel, is that the key point about prediction is not that it requires that a theory predict, but that as a 
criterion of a scientific method it requires that theories be compared in a sense exhaustively’. For those 
students living in a world of multiple truths, the truth is not determined, in some sciences, within the science, 
but outside it. I learnt a lot from the students’ sense that this was obvious.  They found it, I think, quite 
unexceptional that the persuasiveness of economists’ views would by highly contingent (and they were 
exposed to arguments about just how), and so they took theories as competing explanations, not exhaustively 
compared by something like a predictive criterion. This is I think very interesting, as a possible comment on 
how modern educated populations of their ages now tend to treat matters of belief.  
 The very basic, core, content of some models and their implications for what 
is believed about how the world is 
 Some evidence for what economists actually do when they choose what and 
how to model  
These angles were woven into an exposition (drawing upon Fforde (2013) which in turn 
drew upon Ray, (1998)) of standard economic accounts of core aspects of the world 
economy.10 I argued that if we consider economists’ models to be explanations, not 
intended essentially to be predictive, of aspects of reality, then changes in economists’ 
beliefs will not be explained by changes in predictive power. Lindauer and Pritchett (2002) – 
a very readable and accessible mainstream text— offered an intriguing account of changing 
economists’ beliefs. Their central is economists’ changing beliefs about the extent of market 
failure and so the extent to which state intervention is valid. I argued that this core issue, 
which was for economists at the heart of the transition of Thatcher and Reagan, is both 
central and very hard to get at empirically. I pointed out that Lindauer and Pritchett offered 
very little to support empirically their account of changing economists’ views, but that both 
authors were prestigious and widely-cited.  
This led us into a new area, related to the nature of data, that my students had already 
encountered  in the World Bank report, which is that whilst theories appear predictive (they 
contain either a ‘t’ or they are comparative static), they are not: the facts indicate that they 
do not have predictive power. More interestingly, they are aggregate and universal, so they 
have big problems dealing with diversity and difference. Is GDP in Boston and in Ghana 
essentially the same thing? Do the same economic laws apply? Such questions open 
discussion to the idea that economic arguments tend to assume, epistemologically, 
ontological and epistemological universalism. Apart from being interesting, this allowed 
students to think epistemologically.  
In stepping back and asking about the nature of these models, I argued that these models – 
the standard growth models— tell us how stuff is turned into stuff – inputs (for the simple 
Ricardian model, labour; for the more complex Harrod-Domar and Solow, and the 
Heckscher-Ohlin models, land, labour and capital) are used to produce outputs. These are, 
thus, simple production metaphors, gaining persuasive power by thinking in terms of a 
comparison with, say, a farm or a factory, where we think we actually can see stuff being 
turned into stuff. As we shall see later, I argued, pointing out that this is standard 
economics, and in fact thinking in these terms at the level of an economy, is tricky. GDP, for 
example, is not a measure of stuff produced, but a measure of the sum of incomes earned 
by factors of production, adjusted in some way to account for of changes in prices. 
Conclusion? Students liked the idea that it was useful to know your data; and, this exercise 
in modelling is best seen as conceptual, not predictive. It aims to offer different 
explanations; and which is believed to be the best explanation, and how that is decided, is 
another matter. 
                                                     
10 Ray (1998) was chosen as a basis for Fforde 2013 in part because it is (with Tadaro and Smith’s multiple 
edition work) by far the most widely used textbook in development economics courses [Fforde 2013, p. xxviii].  
This naturally led the course to a discussion. First, the core question of model selection. I 
argued that predictive power offers (requires of) natural scientists, as an element of their 
method, something that allows for (in fact requires) choice between theories. Chapter 6 of 
Fforde (2013) was given as a reading, reporting arguments from McCloskey (1985) that 
economists’ arguments can be seen as rhetorical, designed to persuade, and in ways that 
usually do not deploy predictive power as a reason to believe in a particular theory. Further, 
I pointed to a work by Yonay and Breslau (2006) on economists’ choices of what to model. 
They report that whilst empirical validity is important, this is because of the vague (their 
word) nature of criteria used to judge the acceptability  of a model’s depiction of ‘reality’, 
“Mediation [between the model and the real world] is accomplished by vaguely defined but 
generally accepted conventions regarding the movement from reality to models” [Yonay 
and Breslau, (2006), p.91] 
Thus, the nature of the theory Ray presents, as Yonay and Breslau argue, appears as 
empirically grounded, but not in a predictive manner. Given the GFC and its aftermath, this 
certainly kept students’ interest, allowing for conclusions that helped explain what they 
think they see around them.  
If it is believed that markets often fail and accumulation is the key to growth, then it will 
seem natural and obvious to establish a state bank – the World Bank (established in 1944) – 
thus an explanation of why a bank is the main global source of development orthodoxy. If it 
is thought that trade is unfair and the rules rigged by the rich countries, then establish the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) set up in 1964. Further, if 
over time it comes to be believed, on the contrary, that free trade is the key to growth, then 
it will seem naturally obvious that a World Trade Organisation be established to supervise 
and liberalise trade (WTO, established in 1995, the successor to the GATT). And if it is 
believed that each country faces its own conditions, support will be offered with few strings 
attached (the Marshall Plan 1948-52); but if it is believed that there are single truths, 
economists will be paid to offer solutions (e.g. the US assistance to the ex-Communist 
countries of Europe after 1990). So we could think about what works rhetorically in the 
world today. In the course, not perhaps unexpectedly, after the discussions of epistemology, 
and so feeling somewhat confident that they were able to treat ideas both as potentially 
valid explanations and as part of the historical process, the focus was returned, not to 
theory per se, but to empirics (of which theory was part), encouraging students to 
investigate. That they liked doing this was confirmed by my (and the other instructors) 
observations in the classes.  
The next two lectures developed this foundation. The Appendix contains the Subject 
Outline.  
The theme of diversity was developed by introducing students to the cross-country growth 
regressions literature. If there are valid ‘policies that work’ globally, then regressing 
indicators of economic success against policy proxies should produce stable and robust 
results. For example, poor countries focusing on policy measures to support export growth 
should be found to grow faster than those that do not. And so on. Some published results 
argue this, and others argue to the contrary. Viewed as a research program, indeed what 
one finds is contention. Not surprisingly, then, the evidence from some statistical work is 
that such relations are not robust. The research, viewed as a program, does not seem to 
converge— yet there is also evidence that many economists tend to have strong beliefs that 
policy in this sense works, and is known to do so (Fforde, 2005).  
This suggests that there is some common assumption at the level of the research program, 
shared by the individual research projects, that is awry. What could this be? Students are 
familiar with arguments that what drives certain beliefs are matters of power, and 
specifically power asymmetries. Many have been directly, or perhaps indirectly, exposed to 
discourse analyses that make such power asymmetries valid, for example relating to 
constructions of ‘white trash’, race, etc. I preferred another approach that I think created 
space for them to develop critical judgement (and in passing to perhaps better manage 
power asymmetries manifest through knowledge construction), which is at root the idea 
that certain apparent evidential support can be seen as spurious—better thought of as 
meaningless. Wider reading into the history of globalisation will easily expose students to 
colonial and imperial histories, American 19th century protectionism (Ha-Joon Chang, 2003), 
and British land policy in Kenya etc., all to be found online or in a good library.  
I used Kenny and Williams’ (2001) reading to bring certain problems squarely into the open. 
They argue that lurking behind attempts to do much of this variety of econometrics is a 
combination of ‘epistemological and ontological universalisms.’ This for them means the 
idea—here an assumption— that people are the same, and can be understood the same 
way, wherever. This idea of course implies that actual messy histories and contemporary 
variation between countries does not matter. Rocks are rocks are rocks: in other words, that 
homogeneity holds— the sample is drawn from a single population. There is; there exists, 
an economic growth process.  
“Overall, attempts to divine the cause or causes of long-term economic growth, testing a 
wide range of possible determinants using statistical techniques, have produced results … 
that are frequently contradictory to results reported elsewhere. That is, empirical 
evidence is hardly unanimous in support of a particular view of the growth process” 
[Kenny and Williams, (2001), p.1]. 
And so students had to engage with a fundamental question– ‘Are we ‘sampling from a 
single population’?’ Or— does theory work across different contexts? Does the data support 
‘One Size Fits All?’ And reference to the World Bank Report showed there was a question— 
how do we describe the world economy?  Obviously, the Report was framed in universalistic 
terms, specifically GDP, fiscal deficits, inflation etc. so clearly there was a belief that this 
made sense, suggesting that it is not important to think much about whether words, 
meanings and uses are varied, negotiable, contested or all the other things many social 
scientists discuss. The World Bank’s Report treated GDP, inflation etc., as terms essentially 
referring to the same thing, globally. So their view is that things are the same, in that sense. 
Students could then ponder on the specific characteristics of such views, in other words, 
deploying epistemological arguments. This was supported by Kenny and Williams’ argument 
that economists assumed epistemological universalism. What is by this? I answered the 
belief or assumption that things are to be understood in basically the same way, across 
different contexts. The way we see, or model, or explain relations between things, is 
assumed not to vary. In natural science terms, this means believing or assuming that gravity 
affects relations between rocks identically on Earth as on Mars.  Put this way, students were 
not swamped by theory, and started to feel that, whilst things were moving rather fast, this 
was not rocket science. I think that the initial two-step exposure to the World Bank Report, 
initially coming at it naively, and then returning  with an epistemological framing, 
encouraged them to engage positively and more deeply with the material. This showed 
them something more general, enabling texts such as McCloskey’s to become part of their 
tool-box.  
I gave them Fforde (2005) to read. The paper looks at the number of citations to Levine and 
Zervos (1993) (L&Z), in the American Economic Review. Levine and Zervos used tests of 
robustness to examine global economic growth databases. These tests looked at what 
happened to statistical significance when the functional form was varied. They found that, 
in general, significance went away, suggesting that indeed ‘sampling was not from a single 
population’, so that the published results in the cross-country growth regressions literature 
were spurious, and bad guides to action. Whilst the majority of citations of L&Z ignored 
their central point, which was that the apparent causes of variations in economic 
performance were not showing regularities. A minority, though, did take the point, often 
expressed in terms of an increased scepticism about one-size-fits-all policy positions. 
This then enabled me to draw three powerful conclusions for how my students could now 
engage (this was in Week 2 of a 12 Week course) with study (through the literature and 
other sources) of globalisation and the world economy. First, in terms of the measures we 
use (GDP, inflation, normal policy ideas) the world economy is likely far more diverse than 
they suggest. In other words, they refer to different things, not the same things, in different 
contexts. This leads to empirically-backed multiple truths that are not robust, as we see in 
the cross-country growth literature. But the point is that mainstream theory did not find this 
lack of robustness, rather it asserted that cause-effect relations had been found.  
Second, that whilst there is evidence that some economists accept this—the core result of 
Levine and Zervos, the evidence (Fforde, 2005) suggests that the majority do not; they 
continue to believe that theories have wide validity. This was linked for students to what I 
had said before about the basic stance taken towards policy rationality—predictive power 
based upon some agency to use it – the state policy. The two issues here obviously enough, 
are the ‘One Size Fits All’ policy solution, and the confidence that theory works, both which 
predate the GFC.  
Third, we think carefully about how we approach this situation, and how it comes at us in 
terms of data and explanations; it is good to be wary. Economic theory is empirically 
founded but not reliably predictive, and this can be understood by being aware of the 
nature of models and the criteria used to approve and assess them, that is, by thinking 
epistemologically.   
Lecture 4 concluded by folding these ideas back into the course; that is, by making beliefs 
and ideas part of what is interesting about how these things are, and how they are 
changing— again, not rocket science.   
On the one hand we find powerful ideas that suggest that what works here, works there; 
and that things our languages refer to, e.g., GDP, are not varied. But this, in terms of 
intellectual development, is challenged both empirically and in other ways, such as 
politically and the changing levels of respect some have for expertise.  It is challenged 
empirically because pretensions to predictive power are demonstrated—revealed to be 
false—a good example being the GFC itself. It is challenged in other ways too. For example, 
on some interpretations of Trump and Brexit, populations are increasingly sceptical of the 
value and authority of expert statements, and because the very term ‘multiple truths’ 
becomes an oxymoron. It is one thing for, as we find in extant Christianities, different 
denominations to have utterly different and inconsistent theologies (compare, for example, 
Calvinist doctrines of the elect with Arminian doctrines, arguably very influential in 
Anglicanism, which state that grace is there for all). Here truths are multiple but seem able 
to coexist within a shared Christianity.  It is quite another for two groups of economists to 
have, without any apparent way to reach a resolution, contradictory and apparently 
predictive beliefs about, say, the effects of tariff cuts on popular welfare.  I think that 
students increasingly treat such positions, not as truths, but as belief sets, likely embedded 
in particular policy rationalities and so to be treated epistemologically, for, as I understand 
it, the very term epistemology was originally devised to permit a more scientific rather than 
theological approach to the understanding of religion.  
On the other hand, beliefs in similarity rub up against—create frictions with—the increased 
social interactions that define globalisation: statements that ‘we know that what works 
here, will work there’ find it far harder to gain authority across cultural and social borders 
that mark frontiers between powerful cultures. I reminded students that we can compare, 
for example, Chinese and Western development assistance. And, it was argued, this makes 
it all the more fascinating to watch. The students agreed.  
So at this stage in the course, one of my central goals was to give students the powerful tool 
of the concept of epistemology, and by suggesting that economic ideas are important, 
historically (driven home by exposing them to the World Bank Report), students were 
encouraged to look at how economic theories worked, what beliefs they encouraged, and 
how their empirics worked— thus, for example, making NIA interesting as far more than just 
an aid to economic analysis.  
What followed built, I think rather easily, upon this foundation. Interaction with students 
suggested that they almost always found, coming as they do from modern primary and 
secondary educational systems, and also multiculturalism, it quite natural and normal to 
treat things as true for you. They also found it easy to think of identity as self-determined, 
and labels imposed by others as distasteful and uncivil.  
Some particular issue 
Metrics 
 
I spent some time in the course on National Income Accounting (NIA), Balance of Payments 
(BoP) and Flows of Funds (FoF) data. The latter aimed at enabling students better to grapple 
with global macroeconomic imbalances, but also made the same point as the work on NIA—
pragmatically, it is worth investing in understanding statistical methods. The former, 
however, reiterated our point made about standard theories about international economic 
interactions (Ricardo, Heckscher-Ohlin) that their basic view of an economy was that it 
transformed stuff into stuff, i.e., production functions. This, I think, tends to make students 
undervalue the power of NIA as it must make (as we all know) some factor income 
distribution assumptions and so moves away from NIA being a gauge of economic activity 
viewed as factor incomes generation. GDP is simply deflated final demand (or sectoral total 
factor incomes).  
I took the opportunity to link this to Polanyi and the idea that factors of production are not 
produced commodities, partly as Polanyi gives a historical account of the emergence of 
capitalism that is succinct and easy for students to challenge and understand.  I also gave 
them a reading from Kuznets (Kuznets, 1941) which elucidated the assumptions behind NIA 
and also dating from the post-WWII period when, as I had argued earlier, policy government 
as we now find it first developed, with economics and economists placed central. I 
exposited NIA via a discussion of how GST/VAT works. As citizens, students found this 
useful.  
Servicisation 
Whilst it is an observed fact that developed economies now have very low shares of GDP in 
the industrial sector, it is not so well-known that trend rates of growth of services in poor 
countries are now far higher than they were. This allowed students to engage with 
interesting stories, to think in terms of NIA as factor income generation, and to react to 
Sheehan (2008), arguing that the standard economic theory explaining industrialisation 
(Murphy, et al. 1989) can easily be applied to servicisation too. Specific sub-sectors looked 
at included tourism and financial services. 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
As already mentioned, the GFC was treated as crucial background for the subject in two 
ways: one,  as a continual reference point to the failure of mainstream economics to predict 
it; and two, in the discussion of capital markets and crises in the second part of the semester 
course— or subject, as it was locally called.11 See Appendix I for the Course Outline.  
Discussion  
I feared that many attempts to introduce epistemological considerations into a 2nd year 
undergraduate course on a topic such as globalisation would be far too theoretical. This fear 
proved mistaken. The approach taken here relied upon a teaching stance that empowered 
students, treating the idea of epistemology as a tool, marked by the rule that ‘if you make a 
good argument and I disagree with our conclusions I will give you a good mark’ if deserved 
.This meant, I think, that discussions about the how and why of theory then became 
grounded in students’ experiences, as modern citizens of our ‘new republics’, that matters 
of truth and identity should, whilst subject to powerful social forces, be a matter of 
individual choice. This again offers a way to engage with students, perhaps posing the 
                                                     
11 The four readings for week 10, Capital market and crises, were: Boyer (2012); Carrick-Hagenbarth and 
Epstein (2012); Clarke and Newman (2012) and Crotty (2009).  By this stage I was not worried that the students 
would be unable to deal with these critically.  
 
question, if not the contradiction, that asks how their own individual choices exist socially. I 
have no good answer to this! Hopefully it would be the subject of future work.12  
Given this, the front-loading of the taught course with epistemological matters could then 
be handled, especially as it mixed with discussions of metrics (NIA, BoP, and FoF) and 
evidence (L&Z; Fforde, 2005). This stance was reproducible and profitable; and I would 
certainly use it again.  But I would not suggest that it is either necessary or sufficient for 
others. My background is eclectic and has encouraged and resourced me in ways that others 
may lack. I do hope, however, that its stance and flavour, as well as some useful tips and 
references, are useful to colleagues.  
Conclusions 
 
In the aftermath of the GFC, the failure of most economists to predict it and the evident lack 
of radical change to undergraduate economics basic course content, it is possible to teach 
students how to appreciate and understand economics if an epistemological approach is 
taken. This treats economics as a non-predictive science, comparable to other social 
sciences, and so to be taught by exposition of its subjective empirics and particular ways of 
theorising about the world. Modern students, coming out of primary and secondary schools 
environment where ‘it is true for you’ and issues of identity treated as flexible and self-
determined (in a nutshell ‘typical millenials’) can learn about the important science of 
economics if the approach is framed as such . Evidence suggests that they enjoy it, and it 
allows them to appreciate the important roles economists’ beliefs have played historically. I 
would also hazard that they could have given a bit of a shock to mainstream economists and 
others as their understanding of the complications involved in assessing economic accounts 
(such as the role of prediction) was now somewhat advanced, and had teeth (meaning that 
they could ask very embarrassing questions).  
 
 
                                                     
12 Two issues that fascinate me are: first, the re-education, or education ‘anew’, of economists in Australia 
from the 1980s, when Keynesian orthodoxy was replaced, often with taught beliefs that market failure was not 
widespread. I am interested in how, technically, this was done. For example, use of consumer’s surplus to 
analyse welfare changes with the implication that the marginal utility of income does not vary. In such ways 
what appear as individual judgements are actually socially-constructed, as Lindauer and Pritchett can be read 
to imply.  
Appendix I – Course13  
 
The economics of globalisation and study of the world economy is the focus of this subject. 
Coping with this will bring us up squarely with the need to assess differences in economic 
behaviour and variations in belief over time and across cultures. This strongly encourages a 
reflective stance when addressing different economic theories and policy rationalities, and 
this in turn should make the subject more attractive to students from outside economics. 
The topic also enjoys strong empirics: the subject matter is essentially rich and complicated.  
Students will therefore learn to manage assessment of competing theories and approaches 
to understanding and viewing globalisation and the world economy, and will be helped to 
do so. Whilst reference will be made to formal models, and their logic and implications 
explained, the subject will not use mathematics to formally explicate models. The subject 
will stress the importance of various change processes, including changes in dominant 
economic ideas, in the recent history of the world economy, helping to students to consider 
where things are heading and at what pace.  
These fundamental issues are reflected in the ‘arc’ of the subject. The subject will be framed 
as a breadth subject, using the range of approaches present amongst students who are both 
economists and non-economists to explore ways of dealing with different theoretical 
approaches and knowledges and how they impact the world economy. 
Part I begins with a quick overview, and then quickly moves to investigate issues of theories 
and empirics with a preliminary look at the standard portfolio of economic models 
economic students are expected to know, and how to gauge these empirically. We will then 
revise some basic empirical tools used by economists (NIA, BoP and Flows of Funds) so as to 
look more clearly at reports of important structural trends in the world economy, including 
interactions between urbanisation and servicisation, and some basic demographic patterns 
that have strong effects on savings patterns and global interactions. After looking at ideas 
about the role of policy in causing change, we will then examine competing theories of 
globalisation in more detail (Weeks 5 and 6).  
Part II will start in Week 7 and examine various global markets, covering aspects of: Goods 
and services markets (with a detailed look at global energy markets); Capital markets (with a 
look at crises); Labour markets (with a look at migration); and Non-produced assets (with a 
look at climate change and problems of land at the frontier.  
Part III will start in Week 11. Before concluding and reviewing the subject, we will look at 
two interesting topics – the experiences of Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, as a 
possible example of the role of economic ideas in globalisation, with important 
contemporary implications, and tendencies towards economic blocs within the global 
economy.  
                                                     
13 Teaching materials including reading-lists and PowerPoints are available from the author on request. To 
quote the film 1974 Dark Star: “Talk to the bomb. You have to talk to it, Doolittle. Teach it PHENOMENOLOGY” 
[according to http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0069945/quotes accessed 28/5/2017]- teach the students 
EPISTEMOLOGY.   See earlier footnotes for the meaning of ‘subject’ at the University where this was taught.    
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